Summaries

Dániel Golden

Pragmatist Interpretations of Rawls's Political Liberalism

John Rawls's second volume, *Political Liberalism* (1993) is considered by some interpreters a kind of repudiation of his magnum opus, *A Theory of Justice* (1971). Presumably, Rawls himself found unsatisfying his earlier account of *justice as fairness,* worrying the most about how it might serve the stability of a well-ordered society. While the received view is that the change in the approach of the first and the second book can be described as a shift from justice to legitimation, there are some paragraphs seemingly going further in the direction of a thorough revision of the original standpoint. It seems that Rawls tried to detach liberalism as a metaphysical commitment to a universal moral doctrine from the practical necessities of cooperation which may assure the functioning of a society. This shift from a timeless theoretical approach to a temporally situated practical one is described by various authors as an historical, a realist or a pragmatist turn. Following the latter, the paper gives an overview how various pragmatist thinkers like Richard Rorty, Matthew Festenstein, Cheryl Misak, Robert Talisse and some others try to make a coherent case for liberalism by rethinking Rawls's normative ideals within some new frameworks partly descriptive, partly utopian.

Kapelner Zsolt

Rawls's Critique of Capitalism

Rawls's theory of justice is often interpreted as advocating a capitalist welfare state. However, not only does he explicitly reject this interpretation, in *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* he claims that his idea of property-owning democracy should be understood as an alternative to capitalism itself. What did Rawls find so objectionable about capitalism? In this paper I argue that Rawls's critique of capitalism is rooted in fundamentally important features of his theory of justice, particularly his understanding of the principle of reciprocity. His main objection against capitalism is that capitalist societies operate on principles which are antithetical to the principle of reciprocity. The basic structure of a capitalist society permits the emergence of a class society which is incompatible with a system of social cooperation premised on the kind of mutuality and reciprocity that is prescribed by the principle of reciprocity and that is required by the two principles of justice. In such a society, members are bound to view themselves primarily as hostile agents competing for ever more advantageous social positions, rather than equal partners in a shared endeavour of social cooperation. Welfare measures are insufficient to alleviate this problem, for in themselves they do not affect the fundamental principles around which the basic structure of a capitalist society is organized; rather, they merely provide

symptomatic treatment for the social ills of capitalist social organization. Property-owning democracy and liberal socialism, i.e., the two forms of economic organization that Rawls claims to be compatible with the principles of justice, do arrange social relations in such a way that enables individuals to view each other as equal partners in a cooperative venture build on reciprocity and aimed at realizing the principles of justice. By showing that Rawls's critique of capitalism is not simply an argument about the most effective institutional implementation of his theory of justice, but is rather rooted in the most fundamental principles of his theory, this paper sheds new light on contemporary debates about Rawls's theory and its connection with capitalism, socialism, and property-owning democracy.

János Kis

Rawls on Ideal Theory

The problem of the relationship between ideals and reality is as old as Western philosophy. But Rawls was the first to propose to build an ideal theory, distinguished from and in some sense preceding nonideal theory. The question of this paper is, what is ideal theory and what it is good for. In Rawls's view, ideal theory aims to identify the counterfactual conditions under which all the principles entailed by an ideal are complied with by all on all occasions, in order to see what those principles require under such conditions, the conditions of strict (or full) compliance. Understood in this way, ideal theory does two main services. First, it isolates the requirements of principles from the disturbing effects of partial compliance. In this way, it facilitates the systematic grasp of the ideal and its requirements. Second, it guides social action by providing it with an ultimate aim. The paper makes an attempt to reconstruct the assumptions underlying full compliance, and to show how their systematic account helps a better theoretical understanding not only of the nature of justice but also a more precise account of the relationship between justice and legitimacy. It also subjects to a critical examination Rawls's claim that ideal theory must take the limitations of human moral as immune to counterfactualization.

Eszter Kollár

Towards a Rawlsian Europena Social Union

This paper advances the principle of prospect fairness as the suitable ideal of social justice for the European Union based on a normative commitment to the principle of freedom of movement. The argument is developed in three steps. First the paper begins with a conceptual analysis of labour migration in the EU as a problem of cooperative justice, drawing on Rawls' basic structure argument. It argues that the terms of labour migration that are currently driven by the principle of freedom of movement need to be complemented with the terms that regulate the fair distribution of the resulting burdens and benefits. The second section the paper challenges a prominent conception of EU justice, namely Andrea Sangiovanni's conception of surplus fairness. It argues that it does not succeed in justifying the difference between EU-level justice and justice within Member states based on the strength of the egalitarian principle. The third sec-

tion argues that in a Europe of free movement a deeply egalitarian social union principle based of prospect fairness is called for. It affords egalitarian concern with the life-prospect of every EU citizen and resident arising from the social constitutedness of unequal contributive capacities.

Krokovay Zsolt

The Duty of Civility in Jack's Democracy

My commemoration of the birth of John Rawls– alias Jack – a hundred years ago presents the ideal of the duty of civility as a real novelty of his public reason liberalism. First, I give a definition of the ideal. Second, I outline the specific philosophical psychology and historical circumstances of its development. Third, I indicate its central role in a political conception of „deliberative" democracy. Fourth and fifth, I make a distinction between the (public) political forum with its three parts and the civil society whose members do not apply for public offices. Sixth, I consider those for whom "participation" is out of the question. Finally, seventh, I end my praise of this (public) civility by taking a quick look at the so-called "illiberal" democracy of our poor Hungarians.

Attila Mráz

Voting and Disobedience

This paper explores a conditional argument against a general duty to vote for the lesser evil. The argument is inspired by John Rawls' political ethics. In particular, I identify a set of voting behaviors which bear conceptual resemblance to the Rawlsian concept of civil disobedience. Then I show that some of the criteria that Rawls uses to determine when civil disobedience is justified are also applicable to this set of voting behaviors. When these justificatory conditions are met, there is no all things considered duty to vote for the lesser evil, even if there is a *pro tanto* consequentialist argument to do so.

Csaba Olay

Rawls' Concept of Self and Its Communitarian Criticism

John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* revolutionized political philosophy with its theory of justice justified in a new manner. Rawls regards justice interpreted as fairness to be the most fundamental value of political theory and the first virtue of political institutions. However, justice is not a property of individual action but of social relationships and co-operations. In his theory of justice, the concept of self plays a central role since the method of justification relies on specific view of the self. The paper examines the structure Rawls attributes to the self, mainly along some communitarian criticisms. With regard to the concept of the self as elaborated in the early *A Theory of Justice*, two major criticisms are taken into account: Michael Sandel's objections to an "unencumbered self" and Charles Taylor's critique of atomism. Finally, the paper analyses the later Rawls's significantly modified position, political liberalism, mainly along the aspect of the social

embeddedness of the self. The paper argues that, in the final analysis, the self is free in that her ends and roles remain revisable, but only in the framework of common values and forms of life. A tenable concept of the self, thus, is dependent on evaluating frameworks and sets of roles embodied in social practices. While the early Rawls neglected the social embeddedness of the self, his later position modifies the description of the social context of the self in a way that this embeddedness has no consequences for the political philosophy.

Imre Orthmayr

Value Pluralism: Weber, Berlin, Rawls

The paper first discusses the claims made by Max Weber and Isaiah Berlin, both generally regarded as the most prominent exponents of value pluralism. The author confronts Weber's image of the fateful clash of irreconcilable values with Berlin's conception of value pluralism, which emphasised the fact, supported by empirical evidence, that several of our values could not be realized simultaneously. Rawls's political theory stands in the focus of the paper, who sought to identify the possibilities in constitutional democracies for the political alignment of theoretically opposed value systems, or worldviews.

József Simon

Moral Indifference and Natural Obligation in Miklós Apáti's *Vita triumphans civilis* (Amsterdam 1688)

The paper focusses on Miklós Apáti's (1662–1724) philosophy as presented in his *Vita triumhans civilis* published in Amsterdam during the year 1688. At a first glance, the vast majority of Apáti's work provides its readers with paraphrases of passages from Pierre Poiret's (1646–1719) *Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima et malo* (Amsterdam 1685) and Antoine Le Grand's (1629–1699) *Institutio philosophiae secundum principia Renati Descartes* (Nürnberg 1683). However, Apáti had to face serious philosophical problems while paraphrasing his sources: the passages he used from Le Grand's *Institutio* are in fact equivalents to Samuel Pufendorf's (1632–1694) *De officio* (Lund 1672), as recent research pointed out. Apáti learned from Poiret the *indifference* theory of human freedom; at the same time, Apáti maintains the idea of *natural moral obligation* countenanced in the Pufendorfian natural law tradition. The paper reconstructs Apáti's attempt to reconcile these divergent theoretical claims. The introduction of Poiret's Post-Cartesian human freedom into the framework of Pufendorfian natural law theory seems to be Apáti's own achievement, even if his attempt at saving the indifference of human freedom within the theory of natural obligation fails.

Tamás Paár

Reflective Equilibrium and the Imbalance of Equilibrism: Debates on the Method and Aim of (Moral) Philosophy

I scrutinize the epistemological conception of reflective equilibrium made famous by John Rawls, and its metaphilosophical counterpart, equilibrism as it was developed by David Lewis. I focus on the question of what criteria we should set for beliefs to enter the process of reflective equilibrium. Taking into account various criticisms of Rawls's answer to this question, I argue that any criteria falling short of requiring justified beliefs is problematic. I point out that Lewis's version of equilibrism is flawed for the same reason, since it holds that all philosophical beliefs (even ones that are in equilibrium) are unjustified. I discuss in turn the Hungarian reception of Lewis's metaphilosophy, as it was employed in a recent, yet seminal debate concerning metaphilosophical skepticism. I consider a position with Lewisian inspirations suggesting that philosophical beliefs are not only unjustified but also untrue, and I argue that this claim is untenable.

Attila Tanyi

Self-respect, Self-esteem and the Principles of Justice

The paper takes as its starting point John Rawls's claim that the social bases of self-respect is perhaps the most important primary good the distribution of which is governed by his principles of justice. There has been some debate about this claim in the literature and this debate has included important clarifications regarding the concept(s) involved. However, I think this discussion hasn't gone deep enough and this – relative – lack of depth has or at least might have important implications for our theory of distributive justice. To show this, I begin with Rawls's admittedly sketchy remarks about the significance of self-respect in his theory. After this I briefly describe the debate that followed: what emerges here is a distinction between two kinds of self-respect. While I think this distinction is in good order, I also think and subsequently argue, building on the work of Robin Dillon and Anna Bortolan, that it only scratches the surface of the complex phenomenon of self-respect. In particular, as these authors show, the self-respect complex is, in fact, a multi-layered phenomenon and the distinction as used misses its fundamental level: basal self-respect (Dillon) or self-esteem (Bortolan). In the finishing part of the paper I discuss these two proposals to show that Bortolan's version is the better one. All this then has clear relevance for the adjoining debate in political philosophy: all those who want to give an important role to self-respect in their theory of justice have potentially focused on the wrong target so far. This, I conclude, might well give rise to a new feminist critique of liberal egalitarian justice.

Szilárd János Tóth

The Republican Critique of Rawls

The article engages with the republican critique of Rawls's theory. Republicans propose that Rawlsian liberalism – and perhaps liberalism in general – is not adequately suitable to provide either a criticism of dominating power arrangements in society or justify policies that aim to dislodge such arrangements. For instance, they point out that the liberal conception of freedom has weak egalitarian credentials and is an obstacle for said policies, most of all state redistribution. Therefore, liberals like Rawls can only support these policies *despite* their commitment to the promotion of freedom. This is a comparative weakness because no such dilemma is present in republicanism. In this paper, I show that the difference between republican and egalitarian liberal models is rather abstract and has little relevance once the theories are compared more holistically. In fact, Rawlsian theory is, contrary to appearances, the more 'progressive' one.

Anna Ujlaki

Rawls and Migration

There is little said about migration in Rawls's works. The article aims to show that the Rawlsian framework with its underlying *closed system premise* circularly transfers the issue of migration from the scope of the domestic theory of justice to the more international, foreign-policy-focused theory in *The Law of Peoples* and *vice versa*. Moreover, Rawls's obscure suggestions about migration in his later work suggest an uncommon view of the issue. The article attempts to sketch an alternative, although fundamentally Rawlsian position on migration by dismissing the closed system premise and substituting it with the partly open system premise. This position shows that from a Rawlsian perspective, there is nothing in migrants without an effective sense of justice that makes them more threatening to host liberal democratic states than some of its own citizens.