

Summaries

ISTVÁN M. FEHÉR

Science, Philosophy, Society

Science and philosophy can be contextualized in a number of ways, whereby one of the inherited beliefs about science is the claim that it is the product and depository of pure rationality. The paper proposes to open up several different perspectives to the reciprocal connections of science, philosophy, and society. After examining more than half a dozen approaches the paper arrives at the conclusion that our most plausible contemporary context for science is sociological. The password may sound: Neither worship nor annihilating criticism of science, please!

LÁSZLÓ BERNÁTH

The (In)tolerance of Scientific Community: Phenomenological Eliminativism, Normative Error Theory and the Moral Responsibility of AI Systems

In this paper, I examine why the academic community does not react to theories that are almost certainly wrong in the same way. The academic community often sensitively reacts to some almost certainly false theories; sometimes its reaction is even hostile. On other occasions, its reactions are neutral, and there are cases in which the academic community even encourages the proponents of such theories. I investigate some intuitively appealing explanations of this phenomenon, but I argue that these explanations do not work. After that, I propose a possible explanation which – even though it seems to explain why the academic community has different attitudes toward highly implausible theories – is not a comforting solution to the problem. That is because this explanation suggests that the reason why the academic community is so hostile against theories such as young/flat Earth theories and alternative (mis)interpretations of some legal systems is that these theories cast doubt on some academic communities' expertise to an extreme extent.

PÉTER SÁGI

The Freedom of Will: Your Choice

The paper addresses the question of interpretation concerning the debate on free will related to neurological experiments. First, I attempt to show that even the seemingly hard facts of scientific experiments regarding free will can be interpreted in many different ways – most of which are pioneered by philosophers working on the same topic. Second, I analyze some popular writings from different web pages to illustrate their flaws and

lack of coordination, and with it the way a false interpretation can make the whole topic very hard to understand. The aim of my paper is to show how much we can profit from having different interpretations of these relevant experiments, and how important the work philosophers do, in terms of giving a consistent metaphysical background to these neurological experiments.

MIKLÓS HOFFMAN – LÓRÁNT KICSÁK

Mathematics as a Performative Intellectual Game

Instead of discussing the century-old question of the ontological status of mathematical entities, in this paper we focus on the actual functioning of the intellectual (cognitive, understanding, modeling, and operational) activity institutionalised as mathematics. We argue that mathematical entities are not really characterised by a substance- or object-like status, but by process-likeness, and the essential consequence of this is that concepts, theorems, and systems have a real historical (external) and an inherent (internal) time dimension. Mathematical beings are seen as quasi-entities that change over time, which are identical to, and not the outcomes of the mathematical processes of cognition and communication that take place in the collective consciousness at all times. If we consider mathematics not as a set of eternal truths that result from a series of subjective decisions and debates, but rather as such a process, then mathematics is a perfect fit for a performative characterisation, according to which it is played, so to speak, free from external "distractions". What is at stake for the performative interpretation is to provide a most comprehensive understanding of the complex event that is happening as mathematics and what can only be described within limits by traditional interpretations. We conclude that in this sense mathematics – in addition to philosophy – can be interpreted most plausibly as a science that is performative in the purest sense.

BENCE MAROSÁN

Cultural Modernity as the Self-Reflection of Modern Humanity. On György Márkus' Reflective Philosophy

The main topic of this paper is György Márkus's interpretation of the concept of reflection. I would like to show that Márkus upholds the tradition of modernity in the concept of reflection is central for him, as for many other key thinkers of modernity. Márkus embeds his understanding of reflection into his conception of culture, and interprets reflection as an essentially cultural phenomenon.

Márkus emphasizes that the modern notion of culture was fundamentally formed by two major traditions: Enlightenment and Romanticism. Representatives of the Enlightenment wanted to reorganize society and culture on the basis of scientific, rational reflection. For the representatives of Romanticism art and aesthetic attitude served as points of orientation. Enlightenment and Romanticism, Márkus maintains, played an equally crucial role in the emergence of the society and culture of our days.

Márkus furthermore characterizes modern society in terms of the categories of production and alienation, thus settling his view within the Marxist tradition. He also embeds

the notion of reflection into his understanding of modern production. Following Márkus I will also investigate the possibilities of metaphysical reflection within the context of modern academic science, which produces an ever-growing quantity of information in an industrial manner.

Márkus, in agreement with Marx, states that the autonomy of reflection is limited by the alienation generated by the capitalist mode of production. In contrast to Marx, however, Márkus holds that alienation cannot be fully eliminated. An important thesis of our study is that even if overcoming alienation completely is impossible, restraining it significantly would be sufficient for a moderate realization of the Marxist program of emancipation.

GYÖRGY KAMPIS

The New Hairdresser

On a large picture we see the scientist in two roles: on one panel, he wears a fool's cap – this is the past. On the other panel the scientist appears in the role of a low-status service provider, such as a hairdresser – this is the present... By the time I became (rather slowly) a professor, professors were already abundant. And to give an impression of what it is like to be a professor today: it is difficult to gain prestige, because, among other things, third-year IT students earn more (part-time) than their teachers. What knowledge such a teacher may have, it may be asked, if his price is so low? Money is usually considered a “universal measure of value”, so it is plausible to believe that the question is valid one. It takes some reflection to realize that this idea (that everything is worth as much as it costs) may be true only in the long run, at best, in an imaginary equilibrium situation. But even if it were true, there can still be many reasons for someone to choose a less profitable profession, such as working as a researcher (even knowing in advance that he or she won't get so rich in this way). On the other hand, it is also an option to believe in the market rationalism of career choice. Be it as it may, in one sentence, the fool in the cap (which was an elegant role after all) became a humiliated hairdresser by now. And such a social role for science is characteristic not only in Hungary. The present article briefly presents the genesis, features and effects of this phenomenon.

LÁSZLÓ NEMES

Citizen Science and Community Philosophy

In this paper I offer a survey of recent forms of community science and citizen science, and analyze the underlying idea of making science more accessible for people in a democratic society. I assume that public discussion groups, such as science cafés, philosophical cafés, death cafés, bioethics cafés, with their obvious similarities and differences alike, can all be regarded as good practices of community citizen science, providing local communities with opportunities to directly participate in scientific and philosophical discourses. The various forms of community philosophy serve as good models to understand the theory, practice and social function of a genuinely participative citizen science. In this sense, philosophical practice can be a guiding force in reconnecting citizens and science in a more democratic way.

LÁSZLÓ LEVENTE BALOGH

In Search of a Missing Chapter

It is quite clear that a chapter on political myths is missing from Hans Blumenberg's classic work on myths that was published in 1979 with the title *Arbeit am Mythos*. This is surprising since politics has always been exposed to the efforts of myth-making. Myths are vital elements of the legitimacy of every political system and of all political communities since myths facilitate separation and integration of groups. Blumenberg, when reminded by his critics of this hiatus, explained that he had believed the theme of political myths deserved a separate study. However, he never completed such a study. Eighteen years after he died, a text was published from his posthumous works with the title *Präfiguration: Arbeit am politischen Mythos*. This text originally was meant to be part of the original volume, but Blumenberg withdrew it shortly before publication; later he reworked and expanded it, yet, he did not publish it in his lifetime. I query what might have been the reason for this omission, and also discuss some questions addressed in the study, namely: Are there some characteristics of political myths beyond their thematic specificity that distinguish them from myths in general? If so, what are these features in terms of the functions and form of myths?

KRISTÓF FEKETE

Lukács's Reading of Kafka

The paper examines György Lukács's reading and rejection of avant-garde literature and Franz Kafka in particular, who, according to Lukács, was its most talented representative. As we will see, Lukács's repudiation of Kafka is rather ambivalent; I venture to explain what Lukács's motives might have been. I aim to show that the main reason for Lukács's dismissal is grounded in his view about the history of philosophy. I argue that just as Lukács's late theory of realism, Kafka's literary vision is also (from the viewpoint of Lukács) defined by his – completely different – view about the nature of history. On the one hand, the life and work of Lukács is based on what he believed to be the immanent reason of history; while on the other, Kafka's short stories and novels are based on his historical despair, an abyss that derives from the spectacle of catastrophic history. They have the same questions, but quite different answers. The paper explains the philosophical and literary manifestations of this opposition in order to understand better Lukács, Kafka, and Lukács's interpretation of Kafka.

Borbála Kintli

The Haunting Uncertainty of Identity

The aim of this study is, first, to offer an analysis on Ricœur's theory of subject, based on his late work, *Soi-même comme un autre*, and second, to examine the problems which emerge as an inevitable result of radicalised alterity from the perspective of the philosophy of difference, that is, from the viewpoint of thinkers such as Deleuze and Levinas. In the 20th century, a new image of subjectivity arose which aimed to shake up or

in some cases even to destroy the concept of identity. Accordingly, one can no longer be perceived as completely identical with oneself, as our own subjectivity appears as another, unknown and strange for us. In my view, we should not underestimate the significance of the attempts to elaborate a new approach to subjectivity, with an ongoing search for an absolute alterity, but this does not mean that we should accept the solutions proposed without further ado. Beyond my goal to contextualize Ricœur's proposal, the hermeneutics of oneself, on the horizon of the French philosophy of difference, I also seek to reveal and understand the difficulties of the discussed theories. Further, I am going to raise the question of whether it is necessary and legitimate to appeal to such experiences which may eventuate suspending the subject's identity entirely.

