

# Summaries

GERGELY AMBRUS

## **Austrian Identity Theory and Russelian Monism: Schlick, Russell and Chalmers**

This paper discusses Moritz Schlick's "Austrian" psychophysical identity theory, formulated in the *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, and compares it to the similar views of Russell and to contemporary Russellian monism. A close similarity between Russell's and Schlick's views was already stated by Herbert Feigl long ago; beyond investigating this relation, my aim is also to identify features contemporary Russellian monists may have in common with their historical ancestors. I argue that they share some fundamental assumptions: linguistic physicalism, an ontology which may be characterized as physicalist dualist property pluralism, and a dual-language account of the psychophysical identity thesis which is an alternative to reductionist materialism. Further, Schlick, Russell and Chalmers ground these tenets on a structuralist account of the meaning of physical terms which, however, they lay out in importantly different ways.

CHRISTIAN DAMBÖCK

## **Carnap's *Aufbau*: A Case of Plagiarism?**

In a recent article, Verena Mayer formulates a very radical claim, specifically that in the *Aufbau*, Carnap somewhat plagiarized Husserl, stealing ideas from the then-unpublished manuscript of *Ideen II*. The aim of this article is to refute this claim. Though Carnap might have been acquainted with Husserl's manuscript, there is no indication that he took a significant amount of ideas from the latter.

DENIS FISETTE

## **The Reception of Ernst Mach in the School of Brentano**

This paper is about the reception of Ernst Mach by Brentano and his students in Austria. I shall outline the main elements of this reception, starting with Brentano's evaluation, in his lectures on positivism, of Mach's theory of sensations. Secondly, I shall comment the early reception of Mach by Brentano's pupils in Prague. The third part bears on the

close relationship that Husserl established between his phenomenology and Mach's descriptivism. I will then briefly examine Mach's contribution to the controversy on gestalt qualities. The fifth part bears on Stumpf's debate with Mach on psychophysical relations and I shall conclude on Husserl's criticism of Mach's alleged logical psychologism.

GUILLAUME FRÉCHETTE

### **Brentano on Perception**

Brentano's philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the "standard view" of Brentano's account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano's conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the standard view – the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given – but that also makes his account more palatable for a naïve understanding of perception as openness to and awareness of the world.

CHRISTOPH LIMBECK-LILIENAU

### **The First Vienna Circle: Myth or Reality?**

In the genealogy of logical empiricism, the so-called "First Vienna Circle" (Neurath, Frank, Hahn) has been considered an essential episode, connecting the philosophy of Mach and the French conventionalists with the later logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle around Schlick. The present paper makes three claims: (1) We make the historical claim that the lack of archival sources on the "First Vienna Circle" does not allow a reliable reconstruction of such a discussion group, and even allows some doubts about its existence, at least as a regular discussion group. (2) We emphasize the interaction of the young Neurath, Hahn and Frank, in Vienna around 1910, with a group of philosophers strongly influenced by Meinong and claim that this interaction was very advantageous for a reception of the new symbolic logic and especially of Russell's philosophy of logic and mathematics. New archival sources permit us to reconstruct such an interaction. (3) We claim that this Meinongian context in Vienna shaped some philosophical positions of Neurath and Hahn, especially their view of the nature of logic and mathematics. We claim that at least Neurath, but probably also Hahn, endorsed a logical realism similar to that of Russell and Meinong. It was only after the reception of the *Tractatus* in the Vienna Circle that such a logical realism was unanimously rejected by the logical empiricists. Besides the obvious influence of Mach and the French conventionalists on the young Neurath, Hahn and Frank, this heritage from the Meinong school should be taken into account in an evaluation of the early philosophies of our mentioned trio.

CSABA PLÉH

### **The Impact of Karl Bühler on Hungarian Psychology and Linguistics**

This review paper analyses the influence of the theories of Karl Bühler on Hungarian twentieth century psychology. The Würzburg Denkpsychologie works of Bühler showed up in early theoretical works of Valéria Dienes in the 1910s, and later in the reviews and experimental studies of Ferenc Lehnert/Lénárd from the 1930s to the 1970s. Two Würzburg based PhD dissertations under the direction of Karl Marbe done by Anton Schütz on associative sets, and by Imre Molnár on the objective foundations of aesthetic experience show an important inspiration going back to Bühler: a commitment to the existence of supraindividual organizations.

The mature Bühler of the Vienna years had a central impact on two Hungarian experimental psychologists. Paul Schiller von Harkai who spent some postdoctoral months in Vienna developed a functionalist theoretical psychology combining it with ideas from the Gestalt theories of Lewin and Bühler. He extended the ideas of Bühler about the universality of meaningful holistic organization of behavior into a task-centered motivational psychology. The other follower was Ludwig Kardos, a PhD student of Bühler in Vienna. Kardos extended the sign-based perceptual theory of Bühler into a successful mathematical theory of light constancy that interpreted contextual influences in a general model. In his later work on animal memory and the origin of mental life in the 1950-1980s period Kardos has taken up the evolutionary interests of Bühler. He proposed a theory of the origin of mind where the information aspect plays a leading role. In a way this is a continuation of the sign-based semiotic theory of mind entertained by Bühler.

MIKLÓS RÉDEI

### **Parallels and Divergencies: Gödel and von Neumann**

John von Neumann and Kurt Gödel are two towering figures of 20<sup>th</sup> century science. Their life and scientific careers had many parallels and their research interests overlapped. But their philosophical views about sciences, especially about the nature and foundations of mathematics were different. The paper highlights some parallels and correlations between divergences of their philosophical positions and differences in their scientific research and career.

FRIEDRICH STADLER

### **Austrian Philosophy: Outlines of a Discipline at the University of Vienna in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

The article provides an overview of “Austrian philosophy” during the “long 20<sup>th</sup> century” through an institutional history of the Department of Philosophy with the main figures teaching philosophy at the University of Vienna. After a short review of philosophy as a key discipline within the Faculty of Philosophy, the development is described mainly from 1848 onwards with a focus on the last century. The personal and institutional breaks and continuities are characterized by a thematic analysis of the philosophical

research and teaching in historical context. This is done with a focus on the typical Austrian “scientific philosophy” in its relation to alternative dominant currents. This specific dynamics becomes manifest on the one hand with the significance of philosophy within the Faculty of Philosophy and, on the other, with its role and function *vis à vis* the other classical faculties. The process of a gradual dissolution and diversification of the Faculty of Philosophy up to the present indicates this changing role of a long-term, dominant “royal discipline”. Nevertheless, the restructuring and renewal of philosophy as a discipline and research field since the University reform after 2000 appears as a successful and promising turn with an increasing international visibility and appreciation covering also the typical Austrian tradition in philosophy.

THOMAS UEBEL

### **Overcoming Carnap’s Methodological Solipsism: Not As Easy As It Seems**

Methodological solipsism is the position adopted by Rudolf Carnap in his *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (*The Logical Structure of the World*, 1928) according to which it is possible to develop, by logical construction, a conceptual system encompassing all of empirical science on the basis of concepts pertaining only to an individual’s phenomenal experience. In this paper I investigate whether, and if so, how, methodological solipsism can be effectively opposed when it is assumed – as it was until Quine’s criticism published only in 1951 – that the *Aufbau* succeeds in its reconstructive aim. I argue that Carnap had considerable resources to block several ways of pressing the criticism that it overlooks the social dimension of knowledge – but not all of them.

PÉTER ANDRÁS VARGA

### **A Snapshot of Austrian Philosophy on the Eve of Franz Brentano’s Arrival: The Young Bernhard Alexander in Vienna in 1868–1871**

When the young Bernhard Alexander arrived in Vienna in 1868 he was not yet the towering figure of late nineteenth – early twentieth century Hungarian philosophy. The philosophy he encountered in Vienna was, too, not yet the Austrian Philosophy (with a capital ‘P’) which Rudolf Haller believed to have been born few years later in 1874. Based on the combination of unpublished sources from four archives (including Alexander’s Viennese diary entries, co-published in this journal issue by B. Székér and B. Szabados) and Alexander’s early occasional writings, I reconstruct the historical circumstances of Alexander’s academic peregrination in Vienna (e.g., courses attended, intellectual relationships, and writing projects). There is a considerable discrepancy – both in terms of the *dramatis personae*, their writings, and the involved philosophical doctrines – between the content of Austrian Philosophy and the snapshot of Austrian philosophy that becomes visible to us through the lens of Alexander’s peregrination. Yet, the latter not only temporally preceded the former, but it also constitutes the conceptual and historical precondition of Haller’s Austrian Philosophy. In particular, the young Alexander could provide us with an unfiltered picture of what Robert Zimmermann, his Viennese philosophical master, could have transmitted to another generation of young Viennese students, including Edmund Husserl, who convened around Franz Brentano one decade later and inaugurated Austrian Philosophy with a capital ‘P’.