Summaries

On G. E. Moore’s Argument and Proof
TAMÁS PAÁR

In this paper I describe G. E. Moore’s views on arguments and proofs by scrutinizing his proof of an external world and his open question argument for metaethical non-naturalism. Moore was quite critical about the role of arguments and proofs and held that common sense had the final verdict on them; and at least in one of his writings he admits that in a certain strict sense it is impossible to prove the existence of the external world: though the anti-sceptical argument displays several virtues, it does beg the question against the sceptic. With respect to the open question argument I show how it could be reconstructed as a variation of Descartes’ argument from indubitability for substance dualism, in what way doubt plays an essential role in it, and why its final conclusion turns on intuitions that Moore regarded as incapable either of proof or disproof. Throughout the paper I mainly focus on the relationship between Moore’s common sense philosophy and scepticism and conclude that both the anti-sceptical and the sceptical sides of Moore need to be emphasized: while Moore and the sceptic agree that many of our most significant epistemological, ontological, and ethical beliefs cannot be proved, Moore importantly allows that we know certain commonsense propositions without having proofs because we may know objects of common sense and we can have direct knowledge about certain things.

Moore’s Open Question Argument: the Principia Ethica in Context
GERGELY AMBRUS

The paper reconstructs Moore’s early views concerning the nature of good, and the open question argument in its original context, relying on his contemporary theory of judgment as well as his metaphysical views. The paper was motivated by the conviction that in order to understand Moore’s intentions one has to take into account that the Principia was written in Moore’s “metaphysical period”, before he turned to common sense philosophy. The paper relies on Moore’s later evaluation of his early work, put forward in his (then unpublished) foreword to the second edition of the Principia Ethica, as well as his paper on the nature of intrinsic values. It also argues that some early objections to the open question argument, i.e. Frankena’s, are misguided, because they misunderstand the nature and the goals of Moore’s original project.
Moore’s Quasi-Platonist Criticism of Ethical Egoism
IMRE ORTHMAYR

The paper focuses on G. E. Moore’s central argument against ethical egoism in his *Principia Ethica* where he concludes: “What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man’s happiness is the sole good – that a number of different things are each of them the only good things there is – an absolute contradiction!” This vaguely Platonist argument seems to be confused. In an attempt of clarifying the argument and its Platonist reminiscences, a comparison is suggested with the distinction between common and private goods, made by modern economists as well as by St. Augustine. The first three sections of the paper introduces the general problem of ethical egoism, and the traces of Platonism in *Principia*, the final section discusses Moore’s later, and rather different, conception of egoism in his *Ethics*.

„Diligite iustitiam”: Dante’s *Paradise*, 18–20
JÁNOS KELEMEN

The eagle episode (cantos 18-20 of the *Paradise*) has a fundamental role in determining the principles on which the whole world of the *Divine Comedy* rests. Thematically it has two main points. The first one is the response to Dante’s doubt concerning the justice of excluding from the salvation the virtuous souls who were not baptized and had no knowledge of Christ (divine justness is really just? *Paradise*, 19, 67-90). The second one is an exhibition of negative and positive examples of just and unjust acts and people. Dante drew a distinction between the positive justness expressed in laws and law-books, the justness understood as a royal virtue and a political category, and that kind of justness which we could call social justness or the justness of a social order. The theme of the eagle episode is justness as a royal virtue. So the cantos in question are to be read as belonging to the series of the great historical and political cantos of the *Comedy*.